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REFORMING U.S. PATENT LAW TO ENABLE 
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES IN THE 
ERA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
ELIF KAVUSTURAN, S.J.D. 
 
ABSTRACT—The patent system has long been criticized for limiting access 
to pharmaceuticals. Patents grant inventors a limited period of exclusivity 
with an attempt to allow recoupment of investments in the invention process. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, this exclusivity and the resulting lack of 
competition leads to exorbitant prices. High prices limit access to potentially 
life-saving medicines and hinder achievement of the “highest attainable 
standard of health,” which several international instruments recognize as a 
human right. 
The pharmaceutical industry claims patents are essential to encourage 
innovation in risky, lengthy and costly research and development (R&D) 
processes. But it has yet to put forward indisputable evidence to the actual 
effects of patents on innovation. 
Increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in research intensifies the 
existing debates on pharmaceutical patents. Inventions created or enabled by 
AI raise questions about patentability and patent policy in general. Faster and 
more efficient R&D weakens justifications for pharmaceutical patents. 
While continued incentivization is essential, lawmakers must consider 
alternative systems, which prioritize access alongside incentivization in 
order to advance health care as a human right. One way to increase access 
while maintaining the necessary incentives for innovation is to reform 
standards of patentability, leaving some essential medicines enabled by AI 
outside the sphere of patent protection, and fund R&D through prize funds 
and tax incentives in the absence of patents. Alternatively, a shorter 
exclusivity term, followed by a licensing period allowing competitors to 
make and sell the related medicines against a licensing fee, will enable 
competing products to enter the market earlier and drive prices down and 
provide innovating companies a method to recoup investments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[A]nd supporting their master were attendants made of gold, which seemed 
like living maidens. In their hearts there is intelligence, and they have voice and 
vigor, and from the immortal gods they have learned skills.”1 
Robotic handmaidens helped Vulcan in his workshop in Homer’s Iliad. 
The handmaidens resembled people and had knowledge, sense, and reason. 
Twenty-eight centuries later, robot scientists and artificial intelligence (AI) 
systems aid researchers in the lab, much like Vulcan’s handmaidens.2 
While AI has not reached human level intelligence yet, it is already 
reshaping industries.3 One of the fields that stands to benefit the most from 
 
 1 HOMER, THE ILIAD 137 (Caroline Alexander trans., HarperCollins 2016). 
 2 See, e.g., Ying Chen, Elenee Argentinis & Griff Weber, IBM Watson: How Cognitive Computing 
Can Be Applied to Big Data Challenges in Life Sciences Research, 38 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 688, 698 
(2016); Kevin Williams et al., Cheaper Faster Drug Development Validated by the Repositioning of 
Drugs Against Neglected Tropical Diseases, J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE, Mar. 6, 2015, at 1, 2. 
 3 See Iain M. Cockburn, Rebecca Henderson & Scott Stern, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on 
Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24449, 2018); Erica Fraser, Computers as 
Inventors—Legal and Policy Implications of Artificial Intelligence on Patent Law, 13 SCRIPTED 305, 327 
(2016), https://script-ed.org/article/computers-as-inventors-legal-and-policy-implications-of-artificial-
intelligence-on-patent-law/ [https://perma.cc/PS5X-RTBT]; Business Insider Intelligence, The AI 
Disruption Bundle: The Guide to Understanding How Artificial Intelligence is Impacting the World, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 6, 2017, 2:30 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/understanding-artificial-intelligence-
impacting-world-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/LVX4-CVM5]; Paul Heltzel, 8 Technologies That Will 
Disrupt Business in 2020, CIO (Aug. 26, 2019, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.cio.com/article/3254744/emerging-technology/technologies-that-will-disrupt-business.html 
[http://perma.cc/5FTA-A9SX]; Gil Press, 5 Top Technologies for Digital Disruption, FORBES (Apr. 27, 
2017, 9:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2017/04/27/5-top-technologies-for-digital-
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AI is health care.4 AI has the potential to decrease the time it takes for 
pharmaceutical companies to research, develop, and bring new drugs to 
market.5 AI will reduce the cost of pharmaceutical research and development 
(R&D) and increase the efficiency of the innovation process.6 
Patent rights enable patent holders to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale or selling their inventions during the patent term.7 
This right of exclusion aims to “promote the progress of science and useful 
arts.”8 According to the Supreme Court, the right serves to compensate 
inventors for their labor and expenses in bringing inventions to practice and 
disclosing them to the public.9 Under the existing “one-size-fits-all” system, 
all inventions that satisfy the standards of patentability are eligible for patent 
protection, without regard to their social effects, their costs, or the 
technologies used in the innovation process.10 
Patents allow patent holders to operate without competition, thus 
enabling higher prices.11 
 
disruption/2/#32b1eca677fc [https://perma.cc/96R9-27V9]; Anne Vandermey, The 12 Disruptive Tech 
Trends You Need to Know, FORTUNE (July 22, 2015, 4:09 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/22/mckinsey-
disruptive/ [https://perma.cc/38W8-T42X]. 
 4 See PETER STONE ET AL., ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON A.I., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
LIFE IN 2030: REPORT OF THE 2015 STUDY PANEL 25 (2016), 
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3RFV-7WPT]. 
 5 See Williams et al., supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that full automation and standardization of processes 
could lead to a “radical decrease in the cost and increase in the speed of drug discovery”); David Rotman, 
AI is Reinventing the Way We Invent, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/15/137023/ai-is-reinventing-the-way-we-invent/ 
[https://perma.cc/9HK6-55JN] (arguing that deep learning has the potential to “speed up the process” of 
finding drug candidates). 
 6 Cockburn et al., supra note 3, at 7 (claiming that learning-based AI technologies can result in 
“dramatically lower costs and improved performance in R&D projects”); Bertin Martens, The Importance 
of Data Access Regimes for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning 5 (Eur. Comm’n Joint Rsch. 
Ctr., Working Paper No. 2018-09, 2018) (asserting machine learning “reduces the cost and increases the 
efficiency of decision making”). 
 7 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
 8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (indicating that Congress shall have the power “to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries”). 
 9 See Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) (holding that patent rights are “public franchises 
granted to the inventors of new and useful improvements for the purpose of securing to them, as such 
inventors, for the limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make and use and 
vend to others to be used their own inventions, as tending to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts, and as matter of compensation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and expense in making the 
inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit”). 
 10 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. 
 11 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 
1031, 1054–55 (2005). 
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High prices are especially problematic in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Consumers in the United States pay more for pharmaceuticals than 
consumers in any other country.12 A prescription worth $1,362 in the United 
Kingdom costs $2,669 in the United States.13 In 2017, 11.4 percent of 
patients prescribed drugs chose to forego treatment as a direct result of high 
prices, while 24.9 percent asked for a cheaper alternative or opted for 
alternative therapies.14 
Pharmaceutical companies cite lengthy and costly R&D to justify the 
high prices of pharmaceuticals, asserting high returns are necessary to 
incentivize innovation.15 However, the actual effects of patents on innovation 
are not clear, and studies showing the excessive investment requirements for 
pharmaceutical R&D have been widely criticized for inflating costs.16 AI’s 
potential to enable faster and cheaper drug development undermines the 
industry’s arguments for patent protection. 
As AI starts to play a bigger role in R&D, patent law must be reformed 
to reflect AI’s effects on pharmaceutical innovation to recalibrate public and 
private interests. Lawmakers must address the disruption caused by AI in the 
pharmaceutical innovation process and evaluate alternative mechanisms that 
prioritize access to pharmaceuticals while providing the necessary incentives 
for pharmaceutical companies. 
The chief reason why patent law must be reformed for AI-enabled 
pharmaceuticals is to advance health care as a human right.17 Lawmakers 
must prioritize essential medicines—those that must be available at all times 
in adequate amounts at affordable prices—as these are fundamental to 
 
 12 Irene Papanicolas, Liana R. Woskie & Ashish K. Jha, Health Care Spending in the United States 
and Other High-Income Countries, 319 [J]AMA 1024, 1031 (2018). 
 13 See Sarah Kliff, The True Story of America s Sky-High Prescription Drug Prices, VOX (May 10, 
2018, 9:19 AM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/11/30/12945756/prescription-drug-
prices-explained [https://perma.cc/V54J-B3J4]; see generally Robert Langreth, Drug Prices, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:39 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/drug-prices 
[https://perma.cc/QUD5-9HT6]. 
 14 See ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., DATA BRIEF NO. 333, STRATEGIES 
USED BY ADULTS AGED 18–64 TO REDUCE THEIR PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS, 2017 at 1, 2 (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db333-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QU8-VJKZ]. 
 15 F. M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, J. 
ECON. PERSPS., Summer 1993, at 97, 103; Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of 
Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 510–11 (2009); Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, 
Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, BIOSOCIETIES, Feb. 7, 2011, at 1, 1–2. 
 16 See discussion infra Part II, Section C.3. 
 17 A number of international organizations recognize health as a human right. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 
217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights]; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 5, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD]; 
Constitution of the World Health Organization pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 
14 U.N.T.S. 185 [hereinafter WHO Constitution]. 
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achieving health care as a human right, and aim to increase access to these 
pharmaceuticals in order to make sure that the human right to health is 
enjoyed by all.18 
This Article is structured in three parts. Part I defines AI and related 
concepts and demonstrates how technology is revolutionizing innovation. 
This Part illustrates increasing use of AI in pharmaceutical research and 
provides examples of cases where AI has reduced the length and cost of 
pharmaceutical R&D. 
Part II provides a brief overview of the existing patent system and 
patentability issues arising from AI-enabled inventions. This Part also 
discusses the leading arguments for and against the existing patent system 
and evaluates issues specific to exclusivity rights in the pharmaceutical 
industry, as well as the controversy over the effects of the patent system as a 
method of incentivization for pharmaceutical R&D. This Part demonstrates 
how the patent system’s overemphasis on incentivization is limiting access 
to essential medicines and hindering the realization of health care as a human 
right, creating a health crisis as exorbitant prices deprive millions of essential 
medicines. 
Part III presents alternative models to incentivize pharmaceutical 
innovation while increasing access to essential medicines. This Part critically 
assesses reforming standards of patentability, leaving some essential 
medicines developed utilizing AI outside the scope of patentability, and 
using prize funds and tax incentives to incentivize pharmaceutical innovation 
in the absence of patents. This Part also evaluates an alternative model that 
provides essential medicines enabled by AI with a shorter patent term, 
followed by a licensing scheme where the patent holder will allow 
competitors to make and distribute the products for a reasonable licensing 
fee in line with the related R&D costs. 
I. AI REVOLUTIONIZING PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 
A. Defining In elligence: Na al and A ificial 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, the most popular method 
of quantifying human intelligence had been by the “intelligence quotient” or 
“IQ,” which represents a ratio of an individual’s mental age to their actual 
age.19 In the 1980s, an American psychologist offered a different approach 
 
 18 Essential Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], 
https://www.who.int/topics/essential_medicines/en/ [https://perma.cc/6C9P-PPNT] [hereinafter WHO 
Essential Medicines]. 
 19 HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES: NEW HORIZONS 3 (2006); see also ANNA T. 
CIANCIOLO & ROBERT J. STERNBERG, INTELLIGENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY 30–55 (2004). 
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to intelligence. This so-called pluralistic view of the mind based human 
intelligence on various abilities and mental skills of the individual.20 
According to this approach, intelligence is “a computational capacity” 
entailing the ability to “solve problems or fashion products that are of 
consequence in a particular cultural setting or community.”21 Removing the 
human aspect from this definition, a good way to define intelligence would 
then be the “quality that enables an entity to function appropriately and with 
foresight in its environment.”22 
Experts in the field have not reached a consensus on a single definition 
for AI.23 John McCarthy, who was the first to use the term, defines it as “the 
science and engineering of making intelligent machines.”24 Others have 
defined it as the task of designing rational agents that maximize their 
expected utility given what they learn from their environment.25 For the 
purposes of this Article, AI can simply be defined as the science of creating 
machines and systems that are capable of understanding their environment 
and functioning accordingly.26 
 
 20 GARDNER, supra note 19, at 6. 
 21 Id. 
 22 NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 13 (2010). 
 23 See AI NOW, THE AI NOW REPORT: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE NEAR-TERM 2 n.1 (2016), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2016_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8VW-VZXS]. 
 24 John McCarthy, What is Artificial Intelligence?, Articles, PROFESSOR JOHN MCCARTHY 2 (Nov. 
12, 2007, 2:05 AM), http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/whatisai/whatisai.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KEK-
7H5G]. 
 25 See STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 
1044 (3d ed. 2010). 
 26 The United States has not yet adopted an official legal definition of AI. A 2017 bill defines AI 
systems broadly: 
(A) Any artificial systems that perform tasks under varying and unpredictable 
circumstances, without significant human oversight, or that can learn from their 
experience and improve their performance. Such systems may be developed in 
computer software, physical hardware, or other contexts not yet contemplated. They 
may solve tasks requiring human-like perception, cognition, planning, learning, 
communication, or physical action. In general, the more human-like the system 
within the context of its tasks, the more it can be said to use artificial intelligence. 
(B) Systems that think like humans, such as cognitive architectures and neural 
networks. 
(C) Systems that act like humans, such as systems that can pass the Turing test or 
other comparable test via natural language processing, knowledge representation, 
automated reasoning, and learning. 
(D) A set of techniques, including machine learning, that seek to approximate some 
cognitive task. 
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B. Machine Lea ning and Dee  Lea ning 
Depending on the purpose and capacity of an AI system, it may be 
categorized as weak or strong. Weak AI, also called narrow AI, is 
programmed to carry out a single task, and is not capable of solving problems 
outside of its field.27 A driverless car, for instance, is capable of driving 
autonomously.28 Yet, it cannot perform any other task. Strong AI, on the 
other hand, has the ability to think and reason autonomously.29 General AI is 
comparable to a human being in terms of “cognitive, emotional and social 
behavior[].”30 
The ultimate aim of the field of AI is to create general AI, capable of 
“solv[ing] problems and achiev[ing] goals in the world as well as humans.”31 
However, matching human abilities is not a necessary condition for a system 
to be considered intelligent.32 While incapable of performing diverse tasks, 
many existing systems exceed human performance in certain aspects, most 
notably in speed.33 
Until recently, so-called expert systems required scientists to supply 
inputs in the form of data and interpret the outputs offered by the system.34 
To program these systems, programmers had to collaborate with experts 
from each field to learn the rules and decision-making criteria relating to the 
 
(E) Systems that act rationally, such as intelligent software agents and embodied 
robots that achieve goals via perception, planning, reasoning, learning, 
communicating, decision making, and acting. 
FUTURE of Artificial Intelligence Act of 2017, H.R. 4625, 115th Cong. § (3)(a)(1) (2017). 
 27 See UK-RAS NETWORK, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS 6 (2017), 
https://www.ukras.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/UK_RAS_wp_AI_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U26M-K8HJ]. 
 28 See, e.g., James Armstrong, How Do Driverless Cars Work?, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 2, 2018, 5:10 
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/cars/features/how-do-driverless-cars-work/ [https://perma.cc/RB2A-
QUU6]; Alex Davies, The WIRED Guide to Self-Driving Cars, WIRED (Dec. 13, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/guide-self-driving-cars/ [https://perma.cc/SDK8-JT8Z]. 
 29 See UK-RAS NETWORK, supra note 27. 
 30 H.R. 4625. 
 31 McCarthy, supra note 24, at 5. 
 32 See ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON A.I., supra note 4, at 13. 
 33 Id. 
 34 RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 25, at 1044. 
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problem at hand.35 They would then translate these rules into code.36 Machine 
learning changed this burdensome approach.37 
Machine learning is a statistical process where the system 
autonomously derives rules and procedures from a set of data and comes up 
with explanations or predictions.38 The biggest advantage of machine 
learning is that it does not focus on solving a single problem but offers 
solutions to different problems based on available data.39 Machine learning 
operates by finding patterns in data and using these patterns to formulate and 
test hypotheses about the task at hand.40 Today, many commercial 
applications of AI use machine learning.41 Object identification in images, 
speech-to-text services, recommendation services, and search result 
customization are a few examples of machine learning in action.42 A 
significant benefit of machine learning is that it reduces costs and increases 
efficiency in decision-making processes.43 As such, machine learning is also 
a valuable tool to aid researchers in pharmaceutical innovation.44 
Deep learning is a sub-field of machine learning, which uses structures 
similar to the human brain.45 Deep learning networks are capable of 
recognizing complex and precise patterns in large datasets, by using layers 
and units referred to as “neurons,” in a manner that is similar to the 
operations of the human brain.46 With increased ability to interpret data, deep 
 
 35 SUBCOMM. ON MACH. LEARNING AND A.I., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE 
FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 8 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/prepar
ing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ2L-DMHX]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Kurt Benke & Geza Benke, Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in Public Health, INT’L J. 
ENVTL. RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH, Dec. 10, 2018, at 1, 4–5, https://www.mdpi.com/1660-
4601/15/12/2796/htm [https://perma.cc/9FYX-BTEE]. 
 38 See id. For a study of machine learning as a tool for mining chemical information for drug design, 
see Yu-Chen Lo et al., Machine Learning in Chemoinformatics and Drug Discovery, 23 DRUG 
DISCOVERY TODAY 1538, 1540–41 (2018). 
 39 See Benke & Benke, supra note 37, at 4–5. 
 40 Trishan Panch, Peter Szolovits & Rifat Atun, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Health 
Systems, J. GLOB. HEALTH, Dec. 2018, at 1, 3. 
 41 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON TECH., supra note 35, at 8. 
 42 See Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 436 
(2015); Erik Brynjolfsson & Andrew Mcafee, The Business of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(July 21, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://hbr.org/cover-story/2017/07/the-business-of-artificial-intelligence 
[https://perma.cc/VWJ4-K8EH]. 
 43 Martens, supra note 6, at 7. 
 44 Lo et al., supra note 38, at 1538. 
 45 SUBCOMM. ON MACH. LEARNING AND A.I., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 9. 
 46 Id. at 9–10. 
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learning outperforms machine learning techniques in image and speech 
recognition, as well as predicting the activities of potential drug molecules.47 
C. AI in Pha mace ical R&D 
Medicine and health care stand to benefit substantially from AI.48 AI is 
used in the health care industry for such purposes as enhancing the 
capabilities, know-how, and expertise of doctors and medical professionals, 
helping monitor patients’ conditions in a constant and comprehensive 
manner, increasing quality of life for people with certain diseases or 
disabilities, predicting diseases, and customizing treatments.49 AI systems 
 
 47 LeCun et al., supra note 42, at 436. 
 48 See ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON A.I., supra note 4, at 25; CTR. FOR DEVICES AND 
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DIGITAL HEALTH INNOVATION ACTION PLAN 1–
2 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/106331/download [https://perma.cc/W2RF-9G8P]; AM. MED. 
ASS’N, AUGMENTED INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH CARE 2–3 (2018), https://www.ama-
assn.org/system/files/2019-01/augmented-intelligence-policy-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/37UK-
5HAL]; Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present and Future, 2 STROKE & 
VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230, 230–31 (2017); Mike Miliard, FDA Chief Sees Big Things for AI in 
Healthcare, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018, 08:51 AM), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/fda-chief-sees-big-things-ai-healthcare 
[https://perma.cc/2VW6-87SK]. 
 49 See, e.g, News Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial 
Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm604357.htm 
[https://perma.cc/GF94-QBL3] (indicating that an AI device can detect eye disease without interpretation 
from a doctor or clinician); News Release, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Authorizes Marketing of 
First Cardiac Ultrasound Software That Uses Artificial Intelligence to Guide User (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-authorizes-marketing-first-cardiac-
ultrasound-software-uses-artificial-intelligence-guide-user [https://perma.cc/LTR8-RKS9] (indicating 
that the AI tool allows “medical professionals who may not be experts in ultrasonography” to diagnose 
heart diseases); About da Vinci Systems, INTUITIVE, https://www.davincisurgery.com/da-vinci-
systems/about-da-vinci-systems [https://perma.cc/6BPS-TFVG] (discussing the da Vinci Surgical 
System that allows surgeons to operate on patients through small incisions via a magnified vision system, 
enhancing surgeon’s capabilities by reducing the effects of shaking hands and enabling finer movements 
than naturally possible); News Release, Johns Hopkins Med., The Johns Hopkins Hospital Launches 
Capacity Command Center to Enhance Hospital Operations (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/news/media/releases/the_johns_hopkins_hospital_launches_capacity
_command_center_to_enhance_hospital_operations [https://perma.cc/KN5D-WBZV] (discussing Johns 
Hopkins Medicine’s AI-powered command center, which led to thirty percent faster bed assignments, 
and a sixty percent increase in patient transfers from other hospitals, while decreasing by seventy percent 
the delays in transfer of patients from operating rooms following procedures); News Release, Taunton 
and Somerset NHS Found. Tr., New Mobile App for the Digital Age (June 21, 2017) (on file with author) 
(discussing Google Deep Mind Health’s deployment to observe critical patients, and alert doctors and 
nurses where the data indicates an urgent need for care). 
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are also used in various stages of the drug development process, ranging 
from initial drug screening to designing clinical trials.50 
The pharmaceutical industry is the most research-intensive industry in 
the United States.51 Researchers alone, however, are limited in their capacity 
to innovate in an efficient and rapid manner.52 AI improves performance and 
decreases costs of R&D.53 Pharmaceutical companies use AI to enhance 
R&D capabilities, increase efficiency, and decrease the time and investment 
required by the drug development process.54 
Machine learning is most commonly used in drug discovery55 to aid 
researchers in understanding relationships between chemicals and their 
activities.56 Deep learning algorithms are capable of processing vast amounts 
of data to make accurate predictions about the effects of molecules.57 These 
predictions help researchers focus on a smaller number of drug candidates 
 
 50 See, e.g., H.C. Stephen Chan et al., Advancing Drug Discovery via Artificial Intelligence, 40 
TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 592, 592–604 (2019); Stefan Harrer et al., Artificial Intelligence for 
Clinical Trial Design, 40 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 577, 577–91 (2019). 
 51 F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 927, 
927 (2004). 
 52 See Rotman, supra note 5 (discussing the reasons for declining productivity in research in the 
recent years, and how technology companies are trying to use AI to increase R&D productivity to 
overcome problems with research, including efforts to shorten research time). 
 53 Cockburn et al., supra note 3, at 7. 
 54 See Nic Fleming, Computer-Calculated Compounds, 557 NATURE S55, S55 (2018) (indicating that 
the likes of Pfizer and Sanofi invest in AI and that if advocates are right in their claims, AI will help 
achieve the goal of “quicker, cheaper and more-effective drug discovery”); Ben Hirschler, Big Pharma 
Turns to AI to Speed Drug Discovery, GSK Signs Deal, REUTERS (July 1, 2017, 8:10 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pharmaceuticals-ai-gsk/big-pharma-turns-to-ai-to-speed-drug-
discovery-gsk-signs-deal-idUSKBN19N003 [https://perma.cc/3UFC-7YDU] (reporting that a 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) executive expects an in-house system will decrease the time it takes to find a 
target for disease intervention and identify a molecule fighting it from its current average of 5.5 years to 
one year, and chief executive of Exscientia claims that their AI system can deliver drug candidates in 
roughly twenty-five percent of the time and cost of traditional approaches); Bryn Nelson, Why Big 
Pharma and Biotech are Betting Big on AI, NBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2018, 11:58 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/why-big-pharma-betting-big-ai-ncna852246 
[https://perma.cc/MH24-LY73] (reporting that AI groups are aiming to cut down the initial stage of 
pharmaceutical research, which consists of identifying a disease target and testing drug candidates against 
that target, from its current time of four to six years to one year); Rotman, supra note 5 (claiming that 
deep learning has the potential to speed up the process of finding drug candidates, which is a critical and 
lengthy portion of the drug development process). 
 55 Drug discovery is the first stage of drug development where researchers identify target diseases 
and test drug candidates against such targets. See Ingrid Torjesen, Drug Development: The Journey of a 
Medicine from Lab to Shelf, PHARMACEUTICAL J. (May 12, 2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-
journal.com/publications/tomorrows-pharmacist/drug-development-the-journey-of-a-medicine-from-
lab-to-shelf/20068196.article?firstPass=false [https://perma.cc/825B-N5YL]. 
 56 Lo et al., supra note 38, at 1538. 
 57 Chan et al., supra note 50, at 601. 
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that are more likely to pass clinical trials.58 AI systems can also bring the 
traditional number of screened compounds from one million to several 
billion, while decreasing the time it takes to screen such compounds from 
several months to a few days.59 
Big data represents endless opportunities in medicine.60 However, the 
sheer volume of data and the velocity with which data becomes available 
represents serious challenges.61 In 2016, researchers had access to “nearly 
200,000 active clinical trials, 21,000 drug components, 1,357 unique drugs, 
22,000 genes, and hundreds of thousands of proteins,” as well as more than 
twenty-four million medical and scientific articles.62 According to a 2012 
study conducted in five universities in the United States, however, faculty 
members read around twenty-one scholarly articles per month, or an average 
of 252 articles annually.63 
In addition to the vast amount of data researchers must be familiar with 
to keep up-to-date with progress in their field, drug development further 
requires analysis of existing literature, preclinical study reports, clinical trial 
data, and patents.64 No individual researcher is capable of sifting through big 
data in the amount of time that an intelligent system can. Furthermore, 
humans are limited in their knowledge; even an expert in a given field will 
have limited-to-no know-how in another field of expertise.65 
AI enables researchers to cope with big data and synthesize data from 
different fields. IBM’s AI system, Watson, reads, reasons, learns and makes 
inferences from available data, and offers solutions based on its learnings.66 
Watson starts the learning process by accessing the “Watson corpus” 
database to review available data corresponding to the related field.67 
Separate datasets consisting of external, public, private, and licensed sources 
 
 58 See id. at 592–99. 
 59 Id. at 601. 
 60 See, e.g., Chen et al., supra note 2, at 689. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 CAROL TENOPIR, RACHEL VOLENTINE & LISA CHRISTIAN, CTR. FOR INFO. AND COMM. STUD., 
SCHOLARLY READING BY FACULTY IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMARY RESULTS OF A STUDY 
CONDUCTED IN 2012 IN FIVE UNIVERSITIES 3–4 (2013), 
http://www.libvalue.org/documents/libvalue/publications/tenopir-volentine-christian-us-faculty-
2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/HF9R-YAKC]. 
 64 Chen et al., supra note 2, at 696. 
 65 See Hiroaki Kitano, Artificial Intelligence to Win the Nobel Prize and Beyond: Creating the Engine 
for Scientific Discovery, AI MAG., Spring 2016, at 39, 41–43 (discussing cognitive limitations as they 
relate to the biomedical sciences, such as the inability of humans to keep up with the vast amount of 
available data). 
 66 Chen et al., supra note 2, at 691–94. 
 67 Id. at 691. 
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exist for each field that Watson is used in, including law, finance, and 
medicine.68 Watson also has access to ontologies on genes, proteins, drugs, 
and diseases,69 as well as dictionaries and thesauri to ensure it fully 
understands what it reads.70 
In one demonstration, it took Watson less than a single minute to 
process twenty-four million article abstracts and provide researchers with 
177 documents mentioning genes connected with multiple sclerosis.71 It then 
created a network map, from which researchers could access summaries of 
relationships between the disease and different genes, and a link to the 
relevant section of the related article.72 
IBM and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) recently carried out a pilot project to 
demonstrate the ability of Watson to detect insights and relationships from 
separate domains of data.73 The aim of the project was to identify any 
compounds in GlaxoSmithKline’s existing drug portfolio that could 
potentially be used to treat malaria.74 Malaria is a disease mostly found in 
developing countries where investment in R&D for malaria drugs is 
limited.75 However, it has been the subject of extensive research, with 60,000 
articles in the Medline database referring to the disease.76 
In the pilot project, Watson was deployed to review this literature, 
searching for drugs approved for use in humans and statements about 
efficacy against malaria.77 Following its literature review, Watson analyzed 
GSK’s existing drug portfolio to search for drugs with similar chemical 
structures to drugs that are known for treating malaria.78 Within one month, 
Watson came up with fifteen candidates.79 The company had been carrying 
out the same research with a team of ten researchers for the last fourteen 
months.80 The research team had come up with a similar number of 
candidates, although half of the candidates Watson identified were not on 
their list.81 The project was a clear indication of Watson’s potential to 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 696. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 694. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 697–98. 
 74 Id. at 698. 
 75 SCOTT SPANGLER, ACCELERATING DISCOVERY: MINING UNSTRUCTURED INFORMATION FOR 
HYPOTHESIS GENERATION 151 (2015). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Chen et al., supra note 2, at 698. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
18:51 (2020) Essential Medicines in the Era of Artificial Intelligence 
63 
outperform human researchers in terms of time spent in the drug discovery 
process.82 It also demonstrated Watson’s ability to diversify approaches to 
resolving presented problems.83 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of similar cases of 
AI deployment in pharmaceutical innovation. One AI system, which 
analyzes data from clinical trials and academic articles to find new drug 
candidates and potential uses for existing drug candidates,84 took a single 
week to come up with five drug candidates for the disease ALS.85 Another 
AI system analyzed oncological data and discovered a treatment for 
pancreatic cancer, which is currently in Phase II of clinical trials.86 
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University used the predictive capabilities 
of a machine learning system to decrease the number of tests run on new 
drugs by seventy percent.87 
Most recently, a machine learning algorithm that can screen over “a 
hundred million chemical compounds in a matter of days” helped researchers 
identify a new antibiotic compound that “killed many of the world’s most 
problematic disease-causing bacteria, including some strains that are 
resistant to all known antibiotics.”88 Another AI system helped invent a new 
compound aimed at treating obsessive-compulsive disorder, which will be 
the first compound created by AI to be tried on humans.89 The system 
 
 82 GSK and IBM have yet to publish the outcome of further tests on the candidates offered by Watson 
in the pilot project. 
 83 See Steve Lohr, And Now, From I.B.M., Chef Watson, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/technology/ibm-exploring-new-feats-for-watson.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/4CH2-NTG8]. 
 84 João Medeiros, This AI Unicorn is Disrupting the Pharma Industry in a Big Way, WIRED: WIRED 
HEALTH (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/benevolent-ai-london-unicorn-pharma-startup 
[https://perma.cc/6ZM5-64BJ]; see also Using Artificial Intelligence to Optimise Small-Molecule Drug 
Design, BENEVOLENTAI (Mar. 28, 2019), https://benevolent.ai/blog/using-artificial-intelligence-to-
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 85 Nelson, supra note 54. 
 86 Press Release, BERG, BERG Announces FDA Orphan-Drug Designation of BPM31510 for the 
Treatment of Pancreatic Cancer (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.berghealth.com/berg-announces-fda-
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W44F]. 
 87 Chris Wood, Machine-Learning Robot Could Streamline Drug Development, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 
10, 2016), http://newatlas.com/machine-learning-drug-development/41759/ [https://perma.cc/6ELE-
EQFJ]; see Carnegie Mellon Univ., Drug Discovery System, NAT’L ROBOTICS ENG’G CTR., 
https://www.nrec.ri.cmu.edu/nrec/solutions/otherindustries/drug-discovery-system.html 
[https://perma.cc/R72H-LMWQ]. 
 88 Anne Trafton, Artificial Intelligence Yields New Antibiotic, MIT NEWS (Feb. 20, 2020), 
http://news.mit.edu/2020/artificial-intelligence-identifies-new-antibiotic-0220 [https://perma.cc/635K-
E6Q3]. 
 89 Jane Wakefield, Artificial Intelligence-Created Medicine to be Used on Humans for First Time, 
BBC (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-51315462 [https://perma.cc/GFP6-MJJP]. 
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“generate[d] tens of millions of potential molecules, sift[ed] through the 
candidates and [made] a decision about which ones to synthesize and test,” 
allowing researchers to test only 350 compounds, one fifth of the normal 
number of candidates that would need to be tested under the traditional R&D 
process.90 The compound is now entering human clinical trials after only 
twelve months, as opposed to the average 4.5 years.91 
These are some of the cases that demonstrate AI’s potential to 
“dramatically lower costs and improve[] performance” in R&D, including 
pharmaceutical innovation.92 Patents, and associated exclusivity rights, 
represent a trade-off between innovation and lower prices resulting from 
competition.93 Social costs of the patent system are the most significant in 
the pharmaceutical industry, as lack of access to pharmaceuticals denies a 
considerable portion of the world’s population from their most basic of 
human rights—the right to health.94 AI’s disruption of pharmaceutical 
innovation further weakens justifications for pharmaceutical patents, 
especially for patents on essential medicines. 
II. PATENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF AI SYSTEMS AND PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION 
A. A B ief P ime  on Pa en  La  
A patent grant entitles inventors to a right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling their inventions (or in cases of 
patented processes, any resulting products) throughout the United States, as 
well as importing these inventions into the United States, during the term of 
the related patent.95 The basic principle behind patent law is that patent 
 
 90 Madhumita Murgia, AI-Designed Drug to Enter Human Clinical Trial for First Time, FIN. TIMES 
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/fe55190e-42bf-11ea-a43a-c4b328d9061c 
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 91 Id. 
 92 Cockburn et al., supra note 3, at 7. 
 93 See COPENHAGEN ECON., STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SUPPLEMENTARY PROTECTION 




 94 See Paul Hunt (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to 
the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, U.N. DOC. A/63/263, 
at 15 (Aug. 11, 2008) (indicating that almost 2 billion people around the world lack access to essential 
medicines). 
 95 See 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
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holders are granted a limited period of exclusion, during which they can 
restrain competition from using the patented invention.96 
According to the Supreme Court, this right of exclusion is 
compensation for inventors’ “labor, toil, and expense in making the 
inventions, and reducing the same to practice for the public benefit.”97 The 
right to exclude is a quid pro quo for the benefit the public derives from the 
disclosure and availability of inventions.98 Courts have further ruled that the 
ultimate goal of the patent system is the public use and disclosure of 
inventions.99 
Patent law is a “one-size-fits-all system,” which does not distinguish 
inventions and associated rights based on technology.100 Patent law also does 
not address the problem of balancing incentivization against the need for 
equitable access. In providing incentives for innovation, the existing system 
does not differentiate between luxury goods and life-saving drugs, 
effectively prioritizing private over public interest. 
B. E al a ing he Co  and Benefi  of he Pa en  S em 
The most widely cited justification for patent law is that it provides a 
method for inventors to reap the benefits of their inventions and recoup R&D 
investments, which in turn encourages innovation and progress.101 The 
pharmaceutical industry often claims patents are essential for innovation, as 
they provide a method for compensating costly R&D associated with drug 
 
 96 Bronwyn H. Hall, Patents and Patent Policy, 23 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, 568, 568 (2007). 
 97 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870). 
 98 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966). 
 99 See, e.g., Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 
F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 100 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
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Tailoring Patent Awards Based on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 678 (2014). 
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003); Yi Qian, Do National Patent Laws 
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Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2004). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
66 
development.102 However, evidence on how the patent system actually 
affects innovation is inconclusive.103 
Economically, patents offer a bargain between the inventor and the 
general public.104 The right of exclusion granted to patent holders is aimed at 
encouraging innovation by preventing imitation by third parties during the 
patent term.105 In return, patent holders are required to disclose their 
inventions to the public.106 This is the “classic patent trade-off,”107 a quid pro 
quo for the benefit the public derives from the disclosure and availability of 
inventions.108 
Patent law aims to advance social welfare by mandating disclosure of 
inventions to the public, enabling third parties to access the know-how 
necessary to make and use the inventions.109 Public disclosure of inventions 
 
 102 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
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also aims to reduce duplicative R&D efforts and serves as guidance for 
competitors on deciding where to target their R&D investments.110 
Whether these benefits of the patent system justify its social and 
economic costs has been an issue of much debate.111 One significant cost 
associated with the patent system is that patents can lead to higher prices.112 
The right to exclude competitors from introducing alternative products to the 
market allows patent holders to charge exorbitant prices.113 In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, prices mostly exceed what is necessary to recoup R&D 
investments.114 
For instance, a 2019 study of ninety-nine cancer drugs approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) showed that high prices allowed 
pharmaceutical companies to recoup “maximum possible risk-adjusted 
cost[s]” of R&D within an average of five years, and that these drugs 
continued to generate significant revenue thereafter, even following 
expiration of any exclusivity terms.115 Exorbitant prices restrict access for 
some potential customers, leading to a misallocation of social resources, or 
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a so-called “deadweight loss.”116 Deadweight loss is particularly concerning 
in the case of pharmaceuticals, as lack of access poses health risks.117 
Another significant cost of the patent system is that it indirectly 
encourages innovation in larger markets, leading to a misallocation of R&D 
efforts.118 The current system encourages patent holders to maximize the 
revenue generated from their patents and does not duly incentivize 
innovation in areas where there is less market demand.119 In the 
pharmaceutical industry, this results in redirection of R&D funds away from 
products that may better serve the needs of society.120 
Wasteful rent-seeking is another important cost of the patent system.121 
Innovating companies compete with each other, invest heavily, and 
sometimes waste resources in a “patent race” to become the first to file a 
patent.122 Rent-seeking within the patent system may result from a race to 
obtain patents, both during patenting and preceding R&D processes, which 
may cause competing parties to over-invest.123 In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, excessive investments arising from patent races translate to 
higher costs for consumers.124 
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Lastly, patents limit access to knowledge and inventions.125 The patent 
system hinders subsequent innovation by restricting access to knowledge, 
data, materials, and processes necessary for research.126 As the number of 
patents innovators need to take into account increases, probability of follow-
up innovation decreases, indicating that the system set up to incentivize 
innovation discourages it by imposing additional costs and hurdles to 
R&D.127 
C. Pa en  and E cl i i  in he Pha mace ical Ind  
1. The Human Right to Health Care 
Several international organizations and instruments recognize health as 
a human right.128 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
every individual has the right to health, which includes the right to medical 
care.129 The World Health Organization’s (WHO) Constitution similarly 
acknowledges enjoyment of “the highest attainable standard of health” as a 
fundamental human right.130 
The United Nations recognizes the right of all individuals to the 
“enjoyment of highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”131 
and defines health as a “fundamental human right indispensable for the 
exercise of other human rights.”132 According to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “Covenant”), states must take 
steps to realize this right, including steps to ensure treatment of diseases.133 
While the Covenant is directly applicable only to states, and not private 
parties, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
 
 125 Id. at 201–02; Stiglitz, supra note 120, at 1710; Roin, supra note 116, at 1023; NAT’L RSCH. 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH 136 
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006). 
 126 Gold et al., supra note 101, at 1. 
 127 See Boldrin & Levine, supra note 122, at 1255 (asserting that “the probability of innovation under 
monopoly is smaller than that under competition and drops towards zero” as the number of rights that 
innovators need to take into account increases and that the “additional incentive for innovation under an 
intellectual property regime is more than completely offset by the additional cost” in such cases); Barnett, 
supra note 101, at 1269 (referring to “restricted access to the patented good by subsequent improvers” as 
one of the costs of the patent system). 
 128 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 5; ICERD, supra note 17, 
art. 5; WHO Constitution, supra note 17, pmbl. 
 129 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 17, art. 25. 
 130 WHO Constitution, supra note 17, at 1. 
 131 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 132 Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: General Comment No. 14, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
 133 See id. ¶ 16. 
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Rights (the “Committee”) declared that all members of society, including 
private businesses, have responsibilities in achieving the level of health 
foreseen by the Covenant.134 The Committee proposed that states facilitate 
the realization of these responsibilities by such means as enacting framework 
laws.135 
The patent system directly affects realization of health care as a human 
right. It enables higher prices, which effectively restrict access to essential 
medicines.136 It also encourages investment in larger markets and fails to 
provide sufficient incentives for socially valuable pharmaceutical 
inventions.137 A successful system should incentivize innovation while 
advancing health as a human right.138 The current patent system must thus be 
reformed to recalibrate the balance between access and incentivization, and 
public and private interest. 
2. Comparing Pharmaceutical Prices in the United States and Other 
Countries 
Facing criticism over exorbitant prices and monopolistic pricing 
practices, pharmaceutical companies claim that high average returns are 
necessary to incentivize pharmaceutical R&D, given its high-risk nature.139 
 
 134 Id. ¶ 42. 
 135 Id. ¶¶ 42, 56. 
 136 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Knowledge Goods and Nation-States, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 167, 168 (2016). 
 137 See Hunt, supra note 94, ¶¶ 19, 22–23 (reporting that Ministers, senior public officials and others 
claim pharmaceutical companies’ practices, including exorbitant prices and lack of investment in R&D 
for drugs aimed at developing countries, hinder States’ implementation of the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health and, in particular, their endeavors to enhance access to medicines); Sachs, 
supra note 117, at 160–71 (claiming that the patent system and FDA regulations “fail to encourage the 
production of important, socially valuable pharmaceutical interventions,” and discussing the ways these 
systems lead to certain “innovation distortions”). 
 138 See DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 130; Sarah Joseph, Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access 
to Drugs: The “Fourth Wave” of Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 425, 435 (2003). 
 139 See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4, 9; Kuhlik, supra 
note 102, at 94–99; Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 346, 350; Scherer, supra note 15, at 103; Light & 
Warburton, supra note 15, at 34–35; Rowland, supra note 102. 
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Yet, with pharmaceutical companies ranking among the most profitable,140 
pharmaceutical prices have sparked controversy throughout the years.141 
According to a study based on data from 2013 to 2016, the United States 
has a higher per capita spending on health care than any other country.142 The 
study found that pharmaceutical spending per capita in the United States was 
$1,443, where the mean for all countries under investigation was $749.143 
Prices in the United States for four common drugs ranked higher than all of 
the other countries analyzed in the study, with the prices of three of these 
drugs more than doubling the next highest price on the list.144 
A 2018 study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
had similar results.145 The study compared the prices for twenty-seven 
physician administered non-retail drugs covered by the Medicare Part B 
program with prices in sixteen other countries.146 The researchers found that 
Medicare paid almost twice as much as it would have paid for the same or 
equivalent drugs as it would in any other country included in the study.147 
3. Understanding Cost of Pharmaceutical R&D in the United States 
A frequently cited 2003 study estimated the average out-of-pocket cost 
(i.e., the actual cash spending) of R&D for each FDA-approved new drug at 
$403 million, and the capitalized cost at $802 million (in 2000 dollars).148 
 
 140 CONG. BUDGET OFF., PUB. NO. 2589, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 4 (2006), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/10-02-
drugr-d.pdf [https://perma.cc/94KT-LBAH]; MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 226 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); Outterson, supra note 117, at 221; 
Scherer, supra note 51, at 929; Livan Chen, The Most Profitable Industries in 2016, FORBES (Dec. 21, 
2015, 4:19 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2015/12/21/the-most-profitable-industries-in-
2016/#5f9a5c3e5716 [https://perma.cc/W3RE-9JZR]; Sam Kaplan, Why Our Drugs Cost So Much, 
AARP: BULL. (May 1, 2017), https://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2017/rx-prescription-
drug-pricing.html [https://perma.cc/X6V3-C63G]. 
 141 Scherer, supra note 15, at 97; Scherer, supra note 51, at 927; Gifford, supra note 101, at 78; 
Joseph, supra note 138, at 427–28. 
 142 The study compared the United States to ten high income countries (United Kingdom (including 
England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), Canada, Germany, Australia, Japan, Sweden, France, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) and analyzed data in such domains as general spending, 
structural capacity, labor costs, and pharmaceutical spending. Papanicolas et al., supra note 12. 
 143 Id. 
 144 The study compared the prices of the pharmaceuticals Crestor, Lantus, Advair, and Humira. Id. 
at 1031. 
 145 OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVS., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PRICES FOR TOP MEDICARE PART B DRUGS BY 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES (2018). 
 146 Id. at 5–6. 
 147 Id. at 8–12. 
 148 Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 180 (2003) [hereinafter DiMasi 2003]. 
The most recent study by the same scholars indicates that the total out-of-pocket R&D cost for each new 
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While the industry asserts the numbers represent a good measure of its R&D 
costs, the study has been widely criticized.149 
One significant issue with the study is that it does not rely on public and 
market-wide data but relies on undisclosed data from only ten 
pharmaceutical companies.150 Critics also question the participating 
companies’ calculation of R&D costs.151 Some commentators criticize the 
lack of clarification as to what expenditures are included within the scope of 
R&D costs,152 while others argue that the final number is inflated due to the 
inclusion of marketing expenditures, which is not traditionally accepted as 
an item under R&D costs.153 
Another important factor is that the study does not differentiate between 
successful and failed drugs154 and divides the total amount of R&D costs only 
by the number of drugs that successfully obtain marketing approval from the 
FDA.155 The study was criticized for its limited focus on new molecular 
entities (i.e., drugs that contain an active substance not previously approved 
for marketing), as opposed to improvement drugs, which are less costly to 
develop.156 
A critique of the study underlines that both R&D time and investments 
vary substantially from one drug to another, and the cost of research is 
 
compound approved by the FDA is $1,395 million, while the capitalized R&D cost per approved new 
compound is $2,558 million, in 2013 dollars. These numbers increase to $1,861 million and $2,870 
million, respectively, once the R&D costs incurred after the FDA approval are added. See Joseph A. 
DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New 
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 26–27 (2016) [hereinafter DiMasi 2016]. Compared to 
the 2003 study, estimated out-of-pocket expenses increased by 166 percent, while estimated capitalized 
costs increased by 145 percent. Id. at 31. The scholars reasoned that the increase resulted from higher real 
out-of-pocket costs, as well as higher failure rates in human-subject testing. Id. 
 149 The comments cited here relate to both the 2003 and the follow-up 2016 studies. 
 150 DiMasi 2003, supra note 148, at 156; DiMasi 2016, supra note 148, at 22. 
 151 In addition to the issues raised here, one commentator argued that R&D costs are high because 
pharmaceutical companies pay excessive marketing fees to researchers and doctors for their support in 
clinical trials and lobbying activities and base their choices for research locations not on cost-
minimization, but on an attempt to maximize their political influence. Baker, supra note 120, at 8–15. 
 152 Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 5 (indicating that the costs taken into account by the 
companies in calculating R&D costs are not clear, and that large and indirectly related costs (e.g., cost of 
land and buildings used not only in relation to the R&D activities, cost of company-wide software or 
hardware upgrades, legal expenses for developing patent protection, and legal defense against challenges, 
etc.) are often indicated as R&D costs by pharmaceutical companies). 
 153 Burk & Lemley, supra note 104, at 1616 n.131. 
 154 DiMasi 2003, supra note 148, at 171–72. 
 155 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 140, at 19; Emily Marden, Open Source Drug Development: A 
Path to More Accessible Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 217, 234 (2010). 
 156 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 140, at 19; Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 38; see, e.g., 
THE INST. FOR HEALTH & SOCIO-ECONOMIC POL’Y, THE R&D SMOKESCREEN: THE PRIORITIZATION OF 
MARKETING & SALES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 6 (2016), 
https://nurses.3cdn.net/e74ab9a3e937fe5646_afm6bh0u9.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8UM-T2SK]. 
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“unknown and highly variable.”157 The critique indicates a significantly 
lower amount of $43.4 million as a more realistic R&D cost per new drug.158 
D. Pa en abili  of AI S em  and AI-Gene a ed In en ion  
Two issues lie at the intersection between AI and patents. The first issue 
is the patentability of AI systems, and the second is the patentability of 
inventions generated by these systems. For the purposes of patentability both 
in the United States and other jurisdictions, AI systems are treated as 
software inventions.159 However, given the potential economic, social and 
ethical impacts of these systems, some commentators argue that their 
patentability should be evaluated separately from other kinds of software 
inventions.160 Essential medicines enabled by AI must be subject to different 
standards of patentability due to similar considerations. The importance of 
access to essential medicines in ensuring that the human right to health is 
enjoyed by all and AI’s disruption of pharmaceutical innovation, requires a 
higher bar of patentability for essential medicines enabled by AI. 
The role of AI systems in the innovation process varies from one 
invention to another. In some cases, AI systems assume the role of assistance 
tools, aiding inventors in performing certain tasks, like a calculator or a 
computer.161 In other cases, AI systems act autonomously, carrying out all 
steps of the invention process without human intervention. 
Questions of patentability arise where the role of AI systems increases 
in the innovation process and human involvement and direction diminish. A 
number of issues need to be resolved in order to answer the question of 
whether inventions created by AI can and should be eligible for patent 
 
 157 Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 39–40. 
 158 Id. at 43–47. 
 159 In the United States, software can be patented provided that the claim passes the Alice-Mayo test, 
which requires courts to identify the abstract idea in a claim and assess whether the claim adds 
“significantly more” to it. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 
(2012); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215 (2014); NARD, supra note 109, at 221–32. In 
Europe, the European Patent Office (EPO) responded to the rapid growth in the use of AI by issuing 
guidelines concerning examination of AI inventions. According to the guidelines, AI and machine 
learning “are per se of an abstract mathematical nature,” even if they can be trained, and AI inventions 
are not patentable, absent the use of technical means. See EUR. PAT. OFF., GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE pt. G, ch. II-5, § 3.3.1 (2018), 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/2A358516CE34385CC125833700498332/$File
/guidelines_for_examination_2018_hyperlinked_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF5G-PU9W]. 
 160 KAY FIRTH-BUTTERFIELD & YOON CHAE, WORLD ECON. F., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
COLLIDES WITH PATENT LAW 8–9 (2018), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_48540_WP_End_of_Innovation_Protecting_Patent_Law.pdf, 
[https://perma.cc/GHH2-65GL]. 
 161 Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1093–94 (2016). 
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protection. The issues, most of which are also raised in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) Request for Comments on 
Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions,162 include the legal definition of 
inventorship, interpretation of the patent eligibility standard of obviousness, 
and the need for incentivization. 
The issue of whether AI-enabled inventions require incentivization 
relates directly to economic justifications of patent law. The purpose of the 
patent system is to incentivize innovation, and it is uncertain whether 
automated inventions also require incentivization.163 While it is clear that AI 
systems themselves do not need any incentivization to innovate, some 
commentators argue that the patent system should expand to inventions 
created by AI, as patents provide the necessary incentives for developers of 
these systems.164 
 
 162 The Request for Comments refers to  
“[i]nventions that utilize AI, as well as inventions that are developed by AI” as AI 
inventions, and seeks answers to the following questions: . . . 
2. What are the different ways that a natural person can contribute to 
conception of an AI invention and be eligible to be a named inventor? . . . 
3. Do current patent laws and regulations regarding inventorship need to 
be revised to take into account inventions where an entity or entities other 
than a natural person contributed to the conception of an invention? 
4. Should an entity or entities other than a natural person, or company to 
which a natural person assigns an invention, be able to own a patent on 
the AI invention? . . . 
5. Are there any patent eligibility considerations unique to AI inventions? 
6. Are there any disclosure-related considerations unique to AI 
inventions? . . . 
7. How can patent applications for AI inventions best comply with the 
enablement requirement, particularly given the degree of unpredictability 
of certain AI systems? 
8. Does AI impact the level of a person of ordinary skill in the art? If so, 
how? For example: Should assessment of the level of ordinary skill in the 
art reflect the capability possessed by AI? 
9. Are there any prior art considerations unique to AI inventions? 
10. Are there any new forms of intellectual property protections that are 
needed for AI inventions, such as data protection? 
Request for Comments on Patenting Artificial Intelligence Inventions, 84 Fed. Reg. 44889, 44889 (Aug. 
27, 2019). 
 163 See Fraser, supra note 3, at 325–28 (discussing issues arising from incentivizing “automated 
invention[s]” through the patent system); see also Shlomit Yanisky Ravid & Xiaoqiong Liu, When 
Artificial Intelligence Systems Produce Inventions: An Alternative Model for Patent Law at the 3A Era , 
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2240 (2018) (asserting that only people, not AI systems need incentives to 
innovate). 
 164 See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 161, at 1104 (asserting that allowing patent protection to inventions 
generated by AI would “encourage innovation under an incentive theory”); Anne Lauber-Rönsberg & 
Sven Hetmank, The Concept of Authorship and Inventorship Under Pressure: Does Artificial Intelligence 
Shift Paradigms?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 570, 575–76 (2019) (asserting that while AI systems 
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A second issue raised by the increasing use of AI in the innovation 
process is whether the obviousness standard of patentability must be 
reevaluated. The issue of obviousness is particularly important as it relates 
not only to inventions created autonomously by AI systems but also to 
inventions enabled by these systems. 
In order to be eligible for patent protection, inventions must be non-
obvious.165 The Patent Act references a notional “person having ordinary 
skill in the art” (PHOSITA) in determining whether an invention is 
obvious.166 An invention is not eligible for patent protection if the difference 
between the invention and related prior art is obvious to PHOSITA.167 
PHOSITA varies based on the invention, the field of related art, and the level 
of education of those active in the related field.168 Certain fields, such as 
pharmaceuticals, will likely require a higher skill level.169 In any case, the 
more sophisticated the PHOSITA becomes, the more likely a new invention 
will be deemed obvious.170 Once a legal fiction, developments in technology 
have made an entity with full knowledge of prior art a reality.171 Some 
commentators thus advocate for redefining the concept of PHOSITA and the 
standard of obviousness.172 
The final, and perhaps most important question raised by inventions 
created by AI systems is whether these systems can be deemed as inventors 
under the existing patent system. Neither the Patent Act nor the USPTO has 
 
do not need incentivization, patentability of their inventions may be “necessary to stimulate investments 
in the research and development of AI”). 
 165 See 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 166 Id. 
 167 See id. 
 168 See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(indicating that the level of ordinary skill will be determined based on a non-exhaustive list of factors, 
including “type of problems encountered in [the] art; prior art solutions to those problems; rapidity with 
which innovations are made; sophistication of the technology; and educational level of active workers in 
the field”). 
 169 See Ryan Abbott, Everything is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 19 (2019). 
 170 Id. at 17. 
 171 Abbott, supra note 161, at 1124–25 (arguing that creative computers will not only have full 
knowledge of the prior art in the relevant field but also in other fields, expanding the “universe of prior 
art”). 
 172 See id. (arguing that as the role of creative machines in the innovation process increases, standards 
for determining PHOSITA and obviousness should evolve accordingly); Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, 
Thinking About Thinking Machines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 574, 608 (2002) (arguing that tests of patentability, including “usefulness, novelty and non-
obviousness, need to be” reevaluated to accommodate the changes in the concepts of inventorship and 
the innovation process); Fraser, supra note 3, at 320 (arguing that PHOSITA and the bar for obviousness 
may need to be reevaluated in light of increased use of AI). 
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an explicit prohibition against patentability of AI-generated inventions.173 
That said, the Patent Act defines inventor as the “individual . . . who invented 
or discovered the subject matter of the invention,”174 and failure to correctly 
indicate inventorship may result in invalidity of the patent.175 Accordingly, 
the requirement that individuals be inventors would not only prevent AI 
systems from holding patent rights but also the patentability of the resulting 
inventions. 
A recent significant development in this area involves patent 
applications for two inventions created autonomously by an AI system, 
which listed the system itself as the inventor.176 The system, called DABUS, 
uses neural networks and general information in a given field to formulate 
problems and create novel solutions without human intervention.177 It does 
not need to be trained or tasked with solving particular problems; it is capable 
of identifying problem areas and offering solutions completely 
autonomously.178 
The system’s creator and a team of experts applied for patents in the 
United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom, as well as 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, for two inventions created by 
DABUS.179 The applications marked the first time an AI system, not its 
creator, was listed as the inventor.180 The USPTO, as well as the European 
Patent Office (EPO) and the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office 
(UKIPO), discussed the issue of inventorship in their responses to the 
applications. 
 
 173 The U.S. Copyright Office, on the other hand, explicitly requires human authorship for a work to 
be copyrightable. According to the Copyright Office, any work “produced by a machine or mere 
mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention 
from a human author” will not be protected under copyright. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM 
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 313.2 (3d ed. 2017), 
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTC9-U6WF]. 
 174 35 U.S.C. § 100(f). 
 175 NARD, supra note 109, at 866. 
 176 See Patent Applications, ARTIFICIAL INVENTOR, http://artificialinventor.com/patent-applications/ 
[https://perma.cc/YS6A-YT6D]. 
 177 Id.; see generally IEI s Patented Creativity Machine® Paradigm, IMAGINATION ENGINES, 
http://imagination-engines.com/iei_cm.php [https://perma.cc/UHE8-SKS6]. 
 178 See Patent Applications, supra note 176. 
 179 The two inventions are a beverage container that provides better grip, allowing easier 
transportation, and an alarm signal that more effectively attracts attention. Id. 
 180 Other AI systems, such as the Invention Machine, have autonomously created patentable 
inventions before, but the patents have been issued to the creator of the system. See, e.g., Jonathan Keats, 
John Koza Has Built an Invention Machine, POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 19, 2006), 
https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-has-built-invention-machine/ 
[https://perma.cc/KM63-GSGU]; U.S. Patent No. 6,847,851 (filed July 12, 2002). 
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The USPTO responded to the application with a Notice to File Missing 
Parts of Nonprovisional Application, due to the applicant’s failure to 
“identify each inventor by his or her legal name.”181 The USPTO’s final 
decision on the applicant’s petition to vacate the notice discussed the issue 
of inventorship and machine inventors in detail. The decision underlined that 
the legal definition of invention under Section 100(a) of the Patent Act refers 
to an “individual,” and that by using such wording as “whoever invents or 
discovers” in Section 101 and pronouns “himself” and “herself” in Section 
115, the Patent Act suggests that inventors must be natural persons.182 The 
USPTO noted that “patent statutes preclude such a broad interpretation” to 
construe the term inventor to cover machines.183 The decision went on to 
explain that the idea of human inventorship is further supported by several 
Federal Circuit decisions, Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as 
well as the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.184 
The EPO similarly rejected the applications on the grounds that they 
failed to “meet the requirement of the [European Patent Convention] that an 
inventor designated in the application has to be a human being, not a 
machine.”185 In its decisions, the EPO pointed out that AI systems lack legal 
personality and thus cannot have rights that arise from being an inventor.186 
The EPO also declined the applicants’ assertion that they should acquire the 
rights associated with the patent as DABUS’s employers, asserting that AI 
systems “can be neither employed nor can they transfer any rights to a 
successor in title.”187 Similarly focusing on inventorship issues, the UKIPO 
concluded that the application did not include a proper statement of 
 
 181 In re Application No. 16/524,350 at 1 (Decision on Petition Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/16524350_22apr2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AUV-
TM2R] [hereinafter DABUS Application]. Stephen Thaler, developer of DABUS, has filed a complaint 
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the USPTO, claiming that the rejection of DABUS’s patent 
application “create a novel substantive requirement for patentability that is contrary to existing law and 
at odds with the policy underlying the patent system.” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 
2, Thaler v. Iancu, No. 1:20-cv-00903-LMB-TCB (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2020), 
https://artificialinventor.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Complaint.pdf. 
 182 DABUS Application, supra note 181, at 4. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See id. at 4–6. 
 185 EPO Refuses DABUS Patent Applications Designating a Machine Inventor, EUR. PAT. OFF. (Dec. 
20, 2019), https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2019/20191220.html [https://perma.cc/8GG9-
HRDK]. 
 186 Eur. Pat. Off., Grounds for Decision: App. No. 18 275 163.6, ¶ 27 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=E4B63SD62191498&number=EP18275163&lng=en&
npl=false [https://perma.cc/3S7X-V94D] [hereinafter App. No. 18 275 163.6]; Eur. Pat. Off., Grounds 
for Decision: App. No. 18 275 174.3, ¶ 28 (Jan. 27, 2020), 
https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=E4B63OBI2076498&number=EP18275174&lng=en&
npl=false [https://perma.cc/32NX-ZEDT]. 
 187 APP. NO. 18 275 163.6, supra note 186, ¶ 30. 
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inventorship, and accepted the applications withdrawn accordingly.188 In its 
evaluations, the UKIPO ruled that as “DABUS is a machine and not a natural 
person, . . . it cannot be regarded as an inventor.”189 
E. The Need fo  Refo m 
The pharmaceutical industry asserts that robust patent protection is 
required for innovation and that the current system helps reimburse the 
unpredictable, costly and lengthy R&D processes associated with drug 
development.190 The ultimate goal of the patent system is to provide 
incentives for innovation for the benefit of the public.191 However, studies on 
whether the patent system has a positive impact on innovation are 
inconclusive.192 
Moreover, social costs of the patent system, especially as they relate to 
access, are particularly concerning in the case of pharmaceuticals.193 
Pharmaceuticals are different from other products, as their consumption is 
mostly based on need, as opposed to choice.194 Users of pharmaceutical 
products are not consumers in the traditional sense of the word.195 They are 
patients who depend on the products for purposes of treatment and health 
care.196 Lack of access to certain drugs thus poses a risk to the health and 
 
 188 Stephen L. Thaler, BL O/741/19, ¶¶ 24–27, 30 (U.K. Intell. Prop. Off. Dec. 4, 2019) (decision), 
https://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-challenge-decision-results/o74119.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E4D-K4UW]. 
 189 Id. ¶ 20. 
 190 See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4, 9; Eisenberg, supra 
note 102, at 346, 350; Kuhlik, supra note 102, at 94–99; Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 1–2; Roin, 
supra note 15, at 510–511; Scherer, supra note 15, at 103; Rowland, supra note 102. 
 191 MERGES ET AL., supra note 112, at 13, 17; Lemley, supra note 11, at 1031. 
 192 WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 9–10 (indicating that it is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the patent system on innovation due to a lack of conclusive 
empirical evidence); Baker, supra note 120, at 11 (indicating that it is not clear that the patent system is 
“the most efficient way to direct research”); HAHN, supra note 107, at “Executive Summary” (reviewing 
literature on “the role of patent strength in spurring innovation, diffusing information, transferring 
technology, speeding commercial development of inventions, and stimulating economic growth,” and 
concluding that there is no clear answer to the question of appropriate scope and duration of patent rights); 
Sakakibara & Branstetter, supra note 103, at 78 (concluding that the Japanese patent reforms 
strengthening patent protection did not result in increased R&D efforts and innovation output). 
 193 Sachs, supra note 117, at 161 (asserting that in the case of pharmaceuticals, deadweight loss may 
put patients’ lives at stake); Gifford, supra note 101, at 123–24 (indicating that deadweight loss is large 
in the pharmaceutical industry on a global scale); Flynn et al., supra note 117, at 186 (indicating that 
deadweight loss has added significance for drugs essential to life and health); Outterson, supra note 117, 
at 201–02 (discussing the social cost of pharmaceutical patents, and indicating that higher prices hinder 
medical access). 
 194 Joseph, supra note 138, at 436. 
 195 See David Henry & Andrew Searles, Pharmaceutical Pricing Policy, in MANAGING ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 9.1, 9.6 (Martha Embrey & Marian Ryan eds., 2012). 
 196 Joseph, supra note 138, at 436. 
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lives of individuals.197 As such, balancing access and incentivization is 
particularly important in the pharmaceutical industry. 
While pharmaceutical companies are for-profit entities, the nature of 
their products begs the question of whether a different approach should be 
adopted towards their products. Under the current system, pharmaceutical 
companies use exclusivity rights to charge exorbitant prices.198 The human 
right to health care cannot be achieved without proper access to essential 
medicines. The next Part proposes models that maintain the benefits of the 
patent system without compromising access to essential medicines. 
III. RECALIBRATING ACCESS AND INCENTIVIZATION 
The patent system, and the intellectual property regime in general, is 
one of the many available models aimed at incentivizing innovation.199 
Government incentives such as prizes and grants currently complement 
patents in fields of research where additional incentivization is necessary.200 
Many countries also rely on tax incentives to increase R&D activity.201 The 
United States offers tax incentives for research and experimental 
expenditures, as well as R&D tax credits, including a credit for 
pharmaceutical companies engaged in orphan drugs 202 research.203 While 
prizes and grants directly contribute to R&D funds, tax incentives decrease 
R&D costs.204 
 
 197 See Sachs, supra note 117, at 161; Flynn et al., supra note 117, at 186; Outterson, supra note 117, 
at 202. 
 198 MERGES ET AL., supra note 112, at 13; Gifford, supra note 101, at 83; Hemel & Larrimore 
Ouellette, supra note 112, at 312. 
 199 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 38, 228 (2004); Michael Kremer & 
Heidi Williams, Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the Tool Kit, 10 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 1, 2 
(2010); Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 304; Posner, supra note 104, at 58–59; Amy 
Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 264 (2009). 
 200 Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 316. 
 201 Jacob Nussim & Anat Sorek, Theorizing Tax Incentives for Innovation, 36 VA. TAX REV. 25, 48 
(2017); SILVIA APPELT ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY PAPERS NO. 32, R&D 
TAX INCENTIVES: EVIDENCE ON DESIGN, INCIDENCE AND IMPACTS 6 (2016), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/5jlr8fldqk7j-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/76YT-F65G]. As of 2019, thirty out of the 
thirty-six member countries for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
provide preferential tax treatment to R&D expenditures. See Measuring Tax Support for R&D and 
Innovation: Indicators, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-incentive-indicators.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T3HG-K6U6]. 
 202 Orphan diseases are those that affect fewer than 200,000 people in the United States. A disease 
may also be categorized as an orphan disease if it affects more than 200,000, but there is no reasonable 
expectation that the cost of developing and offering the drug in the market would be recovered from sales. 
21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2). 
 203 26 U.S.C. §§ 41, 45C, 174. 
 204 Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 311. There are at least two other incentives that 
are particularly important for the pharmaceutical industry. Under advance market commitments (AMCs), 
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In recent years, costs associated with the patent system have increased 
interest in alternative incentive methods.205 “[S]trong public interest” in 
access206 has led to a number of proposals specific to the pharmaceutical 
industry. These proposals include a global R&D treaty207 and a national 
medical innovation prize fund,208 both relying on a portion of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) to fund R&D in the health care industry.209 The 
models proposed in the following section rely on funding through similar 
mechanisms to accommodate innovating companies in the absence of patent 
rights. 
A. Main Con ide a ion  
1. Different Approaches to Essential and Non-Essential Medicines 
In evaluating access to pharmaceuticals, WHO differentiates between 
essential and non-essential medicines. Essential medicines are those that 
must be available at all times in adequate amounts at affordable prices.210 
WHO has been publishing essential medicines lists based on current health 
 
sponsors undertake to purchase a certain number of products at a predetermined price prior to 
development. AMCs aim to encourage investment by increasing expected revenues and allowing 
pharmaceutical companies to foresee and calculate potential returns. See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Advance 
Market Commitments for Vaccines Against Neglected Diseases: Estimating Costs and Effectiveness, 16 
HEALTH ECON. 491, 493 (2007); Ernst R. Berndt & John A. Hurvitz, Vaccine Advance-Purchase 
Agreements for Low-Income Countries: Practical Issues, 24 HEALTH AFFS. 653 (2005); Michael Kremer, 
Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 67, 83 (2002). In addition to systems 
that directly or indirectly effect R&D costs, first-mover advantages resulting from being the first to market 
a product also have a significant role in the pharmaceutical industry. Studies indicate that various reasons 
such as reputation, slow information diffusion, and capturing the medical profession earlier, lead to a 
significant advantage for first entrants in the pharmaceutical industry and that pharmaceutical companies 
use their position as first entrants to build brand loyalty, as well as prevent competitors from using such 
assets as manufacturing and distribution chains. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of 
Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257 (2004); Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The 
Economics of Ideas and Intellectual Property, 102 PNAS 1252, 1254 (2005); Marvin B. Lieberman & 
David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42–46 (1988). 
 205 Baker, supra note 120, at 25; Kremer & Williams, supra note 199, at 1. 
 206 WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 79. 
 207 Proposals focus on a global treaty where each country will contribute a certain percentage of their 
gross domestic product to fund pharmaceutical R&D. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 120, at 14–15; Comm. 
on the Env’t, Pub. Health & Food Safety, Report on EU Options for Improving Access to Medicines, 
Doc. A8-0040/2017, at 36 (Feb. 14, 2017); DIMITRA PANTELI & SUZANNE EDWARDS, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. [WHO], POLICY BRIEF NO. 29, ENSURING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: HOW TO STIMULATE 
INNOVATION TO MEET PATIENTS’ NEEDS? 14 (2018); Gifford, supra note 101, at 124; Tim Hubbard & 
James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0147, 0147–50 
(2004). 
 208 The Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2017 proposes an R&D fund in place of any exclusion 
rights in relation to drugs, biological products, and related manufacturing processes. See Medical 
Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2017, S. 495, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017). 
 209 See sources cited infra note 245. 
 210 WHO Essential Medicines, supra note 18. 
18:51 (2020) Essential Medicines in the Era of Artificial Intelligence 
81 
needs since 1977.211 WHO’s periodically updated lists provide a guideline 
for countries to develop their own lists.212 The latest WHO list includes drugs 
ranging from antibiotics to drugs used for the treatment of cancer, HIV, and 
malaria.213 
Access to essential medicines is “a key component of the fulfillment of 
the human right to health.”214 The models here thus focus on essential 
medicines. The models aim to increase access by reforming patentability 
standards to leave some essential medicines enabled by AI outside the scope 
of patentability, or alternatively, decreasing the patent term available for 
such medicines. Non-essential medicines will remain under the existing 
system, as they are less likely to have a significant impact on global health. 
Patents on these medicines will allow innovating companies to freely decide 
prices in the absence of competitors and help raise funds for future R&D 
investments. 
2. The Path to Patent Law Reform 
Congress is limited by the United States Constitution in determining the 
sphere of patent protection and granting exclusivity for limited terms.215 That 
said, Congress is free to decide the scope and breadth of intellectual property 
rights.216 It may impose conditions on patent rights, limit duration, refuse 
granting privileges, or provide special rights for certain industries, as 
opposed to employing a uniform intellectual property system.217 As such, 
Congress has the authority to subject inventions concerning essential 
medicines enabled by AI to different eligibility standards, as well as to confer 
a different scope of rights to such inventions. 
Nevertheless, any reform to the existing patent system must be 
compliant with the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS).218 TRIPS requires patentability of all novel, useful, 
and non-obvious inventions, and prohibits differential treatment based on 
 
 211 Id. 
 212 Frederick Abbott et al., Global Health Law, 77 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 203, 210 (2016). 
 213 See WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES (21st ed. 2019), 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/325771/WHO-MVP-EMP-IAU-2019.06-eng.pdf?ua=1 
[https://perma.cc/R3DM-HL2D]. 
 214 Id. 
 215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 216 ROBERT L. HARMON, HARMON ON PATENTS: BLACK-LETTER LAW AND COMMENTARY 30 
(2007). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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technology.219 Article 27.2 provides an exception to this rule in cases where 
protection of human life and health require exclusion of patentability.220 
However, the provision indicates that an invention cannot be excluded from 
patentability based on this exception “merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by . . . law.”221 
The models proposed here do not exclude pharmaceuticals from 
patentability in general but merely change the standard of patentability, or 
alternatively the exclusivity period, for essential medicines enabled by AI 
with an aim to ensure wider access to pharmaceuticals. There is thus an 
argument to be made that the proposed law reforms fall within the scope of 
the exception. However, the best course of action is to urge the World Trade 
Organization to recognize the right of countries to subject essential 
medicines enabled by AI to different standards.222 
3. Regulatory Exclusivity Conferred by the FDA 
In addition to patents, FDA regulations provide two types of regulatory 
exclusivities for certain groups of pharmaceuticals.223 The first type, market 
exclusivity, prohibits the FDA from granting marketing approval to 
substitute drugs within the exclusivity period; while the second type, data 
exclusivity, prohibits competitors from relying on innovator company data 
to receive marketing approval but allows approval of drugs that rely on the 
competitor’s own data.224 To allow the proposed law reforms to have their 
full effect and maximize access to essential medicines, Congress must also 
abolish these marketing and data exclusivity practices. 
 
 219 Id. art. 27.1. 
 220 Id. art. 27.2. 
 221 Id. 
 222 A similar proposal has been made before by International Law Association’s Global Health Law 
Committee. See Abbott et al., supra note 212, at 216 (proposing that the UN General Assembly adopt a 
resolution to urge the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference to “provide an 
authoritative interpretation of articles 27 and 30” that allows member states to exclude essential medicines 
from patentability). 
 223 As of 2017, the FDA enforces sixteen exclusivities, “relating to new chemical entities, new 
clinical studies, orphan drugs, pediatric studies, generic drugs, antibiotics, qualified infectious disease 
products, enantiomers, and biologics.” See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R44951, REGULATORY 
EXCLUSIVITY REFORM IN THE 115TH CONGRESS 1–3 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44951.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5N87-JELL]. 
 224 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2020); 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2); Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 505(A), 111 Stat. 2296, 2305 (1997); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 7001, 124 Stat. 804 (2010); see also JOHN R. THOMAS, supra note 223, at 4. 
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B. Re hinking Pa en  La  fo  E en ial Medicine  Enabled b  AI 
Pharmaceutical patents are relatively new in many countries. France, 
Germany, Switzerland, and a number of other jurisdictions did not allow 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products until after the mid-1900s.225 
Before TRIPS, over forty countries did not protect pharmaceutical products 
under a patent regime.226 While these countries issued patents for 
manufacturing processes, third parties were allowed to produce the same 
product through different, unpatented processes.227 
This pre-TRIPS model may be ideal where the ultimate aim is to 
maximize access. However, renouncing incentivization in favor of access is 
an unrealistic approach given the industry’s overemphasis on its reliance on 
the patent system.228 The models proposed in this Article thus aim to maintain 
the benefits of the patent system and increase access to essential medicines. 
1. Reforming Patent Eligibility Standards 
Redefining standards of patentability and patentable subject matter, to 
leave essential medicines enabled by AI outside the scope of the patent 
system will increase access by ensuring a competitive market, which will 
drive prices down. In this model, non-essential medicines will still be entitled 
to patent protection, provided that the invention satisfies existing 
requirements for patent eligibility. Innovating companies will similarly be 
entitled to patent protection if they can demonstrate that their R&D processes 
do not rely on AI systems. 
The reform will be accompanied by a ten-year transition period where 
an otherwise ineligible essential medicine will be entitled to patent protection 
if (i) documentation from the FDA shows it to be more effective than 
alternative products in the market, or (ii) if the innovating company 
demonstrates the associated R&D costs to be considerably higher than 
industry average.229 
 
 225 BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 140, at 215–18; DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 127–28. 
 226 WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], 
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/ [perma.cc/P8SB-S4HJ]. 
 227 BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 140, at 215–18; DUTFIELD, supra note 120, at 127–28. 
 228 See FTC REPORT ON COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW, supra note 102, at 1, 4, 9; Kuhlik, supra 
note 102, at 94–99; Eisenberg, supra note 100, at 346, 350; Light & Warburton, supra note 15, at 1–2; 
Roin, supra note 15, at 510–11; Scherer, supra note 15, at 103; Rowland, supra note 102. 
 229 A similar system of exceptions is proposed by F. M. Scherer, who proposes shortened patent 
terms except in cases where first mover advantages are not sufficient or the related firm is small and has 
a limited market, or an individual request is made based on a number of claims, including extraordinarily 
high R&D costs compared to the relevant industry. See F. M. Scherer, First Mover Advantages and 
Optimal Patent Protection 13–14 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, 
Working Paper No. RPP-2015-05, 2015), 
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The first exception will aid in directing R&D efforts to inventions with 
potential for more social value. Under the second exception, innovating 
companies investing heavily in their R&D processes, such as those 
developing in-house AI systems, will be entitled to patent protection for both 
essential and non-essential medicines. Through these exceptions, the new 
system will retain some of the incentives available under the current regime 
for a period of ten years. This transition period will allow for observation of 
the new system and for adjustment of its application if necessary. 
2. Shorter Exclusivity Term for Essential Medicines Enabled by AI 
An alternative model is to maintain the existing rules and standards of 
patentability and shorten the exclusivity term for essential medicines enabled 
by AI to five years.230 The five-year term will commence on the earlier date 
of marketing approval by the FDA or date of marketing. Upon expiration of 
the five-year exclusivity term, third parties will be entitled to manufacture 
and sell the patented product against a royalty to be paid throughout the 




 230 A study analyzing R&D profitability for different market conditions and patent terms concluded 
that R&D investment is profitable under most market conditions regardless of patent term. See id. at 5–
8. The study indicated that the patent system aids innovation most significantly in smaller markets and 
that short patent terms affect R&D investment decisions only in such markets and offered a five-year 
patent term as an efficient alternative to the existing system. Id. at 6–7, 13. 
 231 As opposed to compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement, the parties will not be required 
to negotiate licensing conditions in advance. Scholars have entertained the idea of similar systems, where 
third parties would be entitled to use inventions or related data upon payment of a compensation to the 
innovator during a predetermined period. See J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: 
Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1744–98 (2000) (proposing a 
“compensatory liability regime” for sub-patentable inventions, such as databases, where the amount of 
compensation would be negotiated between the parties on a case-by-case basis, with the option to resort 
to arbitration in case of failure to reach an agreement or where contribution would be determined based 
on predetermined percentages of the third party’s gross revenue depending on how significant use of the 
original invention is in the subsequent product); James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of 
New Medicines and Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 180–86 (2009) (discussing a compensatory 
liability system, which can range from a mandatory compulsory license to less stringent applications, 
allowing third parties to use the invention upon payment of appropriate remuneration); Lea M. Gulotta, 
Pharming Out Data: A Proposal for Promoting Innovation and Public Health through a Hybrid Clinical 
Data Protection Scheme, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1469, 1503–04 (2018) (proposing one-year 
regulatory data exclusivity for all pharmaceuticals, followed by four years of cost-sharing with 
subsequent users of related data); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to 
Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs 
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 482–99 (2004) (proposing a system where generic manufacturers 
can use data from brand-name manufacturers upon payment of a compensation in proportion to the benefit 
they obtain from using such data, and providing a formula which can be altered based on market 
conditions, in terms of length of time during which the brand-name manufacturer is entitled to royalties, 
maximum number of competitors required to pay royalties, and interest rate to account for the time value 
of money). 
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inventions by companies which do not rely on AI in their R&D processes, 
will enjoy the current twenty-year exclusivity period. This reform will also 
similarly be accompanied by a ten-year transition period with exceptions for 
more effective drugs and R&D costs exceeding the industry average. 
The most important aspect of this model is to adopt a fair and efficient 
royalty scheme. Royalties will be determined based on the total cost of R&D, 
which the innovating company will submit to the USPTO during the patent 
application process,232 and shared by the licensees wishing to manufacture 
and sell the product. The contribution of each licensee may be determined 
based on the markets where it plans to offer the product,233 or the total cost 
may be shared equally by all licensees.234 
Under the former scheme, the license will be liable for ten percent of 
the total costs to sell the product in a market that represents ten percent of 
the global market. In the latter, the total cost will be divided equally between 
the licensees, and the amount of royalties owed will decrease with new 
licensees. The maximum amount of compensation the innovating company 
can receive may be limited to the total cost of R&D or to a predetermined 
multiple of this amount. 
C. E al a ing he Po en ial Effec  of P o o ed La  Refo m  
There are multiple advantages to the models proposed in this Article. In 
the first model, absence of exclusivity rights will enable competitors to enter 
the market as soon as the innovating company makes the drug available to 
the market. In the second model, a shortened exclusivity term will allow 
competitors to enter the market in the relatively shorter period of time of five 
years. In both cases, increased competition will bring down prices. In 
practice, this will translate into more people having access to essential 
medicines.235 By removing the restrictions on access to inventions by 
competitors and innovators in other fields, the proposed models will also 
have a positive impact on subsequent innovation.236 
 
 232 What items fall under R&D costs should be defined by the USPTO and the FDA, following 
consultations with the industry. 
 233 For a similar method, see Gulotta, supra note 231, at 1503–04 (discussing a “pro rata data 
exclusivity and cost sharing” model). 
 234 For a similar method, see Fellmeth, supra note 231, at 481–82 (discussing a “simple division 
royalties model”). 
 235 For a discussion of high prices limiting access to pharmaceuticals, see Gifford, supra note 101, 
at 83, 102 n.118; see also Dam, supra note 116, at 247; Barnett, supra note 101, at 1269; Burstein & 
Murray, supra note 116, at 410; Roin, supra note 116, at 1023–24. 
 236 For a discussion of the patent system’s effects on subsequent innovation, see Outterson, supra 
note 117, at 201–02; Stiglitz, supra note 120, at 1710; Roin, supra note 116, at 1023; NAT’L RSCH. 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 125; Gold et al., supra note 101, at 1; Boldrin & Levine, 
supra note 122, at 1255. 
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One drawback is that both models require a determination of what 
constitutes enablement by AI. The USPTO will need to evaluate eligibility 
claims on a case-by-case basis and decide whether the role of the AI system 
amounts to more than a standard tool of research in each case. The models 
may also raise some concerns regarding incentivization. Especially in the 
absence of patent rights, innovating companies may shift their focus to non-
essential medicines that will still be eligible for patent protection or opt out 
from using or disclosing their use of AI systems. The models must thus be 
accompanied by appropriate alternatives to preserve the benefits of the patent 
system. The incentive methods set forth in the next Section are designed to 
address these concerns. While these methods are aimed at incentivizing 
R&D in the absence of patent rights and associated exclusivity periods, they 
may be extended to the second model as necessary to supplement 
incentivization through royalties. 
D. Incen i i ing R&D fo  E en ial Medicine  in he Ab ence of Pa en  
1. A National Prize Fund 
A 2017 bill, the Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act, recently proposed 
a national prize fund.237 The bill recognized market exclusivity to be an 
“expensive, inefficient, and unfair mechanism to reward investments in new 
products”238 and asserted that drug development would benefit from “greater 
sharing of knowledge, data, materials, and technologies.”239 The bill 
recommended removing the link between R&D incentives and product 
prices, claiming that this will allow a dramatic decrease in the costs of 
innovation and an increase in access to inventions.240 The bill thus proposed 
to abolish patents and market exclusivity for drugs and biological products, 
as well as related manufacturing processes,241 and to fund R&D through a 
national prize fund.242 
This Article similarly proposes a fund with a specific focus on essential 
medicines. Prizes will be awarded by a board, based on the impact of each 
drug on global public health,243 and payments will be conditioned upon 
 
 237 Medical Innovation Prize Fund Act of 2017, S. 495, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 238 Id. § 2. 
 239 Id. § 2(5). 
 240 Id. § 2(3). 
 241 Id. § 5. 
 242 According to the bill, allocating 0.55 percent of the GDP in 2016 would have led to a fund of over 
$100 billion. Id. § 2(4). 
 243 In a 2019 Senate hearing, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry indicated that they 
favored “value-based” reimbursement, which would base compensation they receive from the market on 
how effective their drugs are. Rowland, supra note 102. For different methods of measuring health 
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abandonment of patents, if any. In addition to disclosure of all clinical trial 
data and other information enabling those “skilled in the art . . . to make and 
use” the invention,244 eligibility for prizes will require disclosure of all 
relevant information on the AI system used in the R&D process. 
A national prize fund designed in this manner will provide the 
incentives necessary to sustain essential medicines research. The 
government will also be in a position to allocate prizes to encourage 
investment in certain areas over others. For instance, higher prizes may be 
offered to essential medicines with smaller markets, such as orphan drugs. 
Prizes for AI-enabled essential medicines will also encourage the use of AI 
in the innovation process and allow access to data that will build a better 
understanding of how AI systems work. 
2. A Global R&D Treaty 
The need to balance access and incentivization has led to calls for a 
multilateral treaty to finance R&D and break the link between 
pharmaceutical prices and R&D costs.245 Most notably, WHO proposed a 
global R&D treaty where all countries would commit at least 0.01 percent of 
their GDPs to government funded research focusing on the health needs of 
developing countries.246 The United Nations supported the idea of a binding 
 
impact, see AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES 
ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 27–34 (2008). 
 244 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 245 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 120, at 14–15 (proposing a system where countries contribute in 
proportion to their “comparable levels of development,” with the poorest countries contributing the least 
or nothing); Comm. on the Env’t, Pub. Health & Food Safety, supra note 207, at 13, 36 (acknowledging 
that access to medicine is a “shared responsibility of all actors” in the health care industry, and proposing 
consideration of a R&D financing pool made up of 0.01% of each member state’s GDP); Abbott et al., 
supra note 212, at 216–21 (proposing a Framework Convention on Pharmaceutical Innovation with an 
additional protocol on financing); PANTELI & EDWARDS, supra note 207, at 24 (arguing that a pooling 
financial mechanism is a “necessary first step” for a sustainable global solution to delink R&D costs from 
prices); Gifford, supra note 101, at 124 (arguing that the American public bears the cost of pharmaceutical 
R&D more than other nations, as pharmaceutical prices are higher in the United States, and proposing a 
system of public funding proportionate to each nation’s GDP or per capita income for a more equitable 
solution). See generally Hubbard & Love, supra note 207, at 0147–50 (proposing a new trade framework 
requiring countries to contribute a fixed percentage of their GDP and allowing them the freedom to choose 
granting patents on pharmaceuticals once such contribution is made). 
 246 CONSULTATIVE EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON RES. & DEV.: FIN. & COORDINATION, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. [WHO], RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET HEALTH NEEDS IN DEVELOPING 
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R&D treaty focused on de-linking R&D costs from prices in the quest to 
promote access to pharmaceuticals and incentivize innovation.247 
As equal global access requires each country to share the cost of 
research, a global R&D treaty should accompany the national prize fund. 
Party states should contribute incrementally based on their respective GDPs, 
with a certain percentage of the funds raised under the treaty dedicated to 
essential medicines. To ensure widest possible access, essential medicines 
that may be entitled to patent protection should be collected under a pool 
operated by WHO, and made available to third parties against due 
compensation.248 Any revenue raised by the use of these pharmaceuticals 
would then be added to the R&D fund under the treaty. 
3. Tax Incentives 
In the United States, tax incentives related to R&D activities are 
regulated under both state and federal law.249 At the federal level, Sections 
41 and 174 of the Internal Revenue Code regulate tax incentives applicable 
to R&D in all industries.250 Under Section 174, taxpayers are entitled to treat 
research and experimental expenditures as expenses subject to certain 
conditions.251 Credit for increasing research activities, regulated under 
Section 41, provides a credit against tax for qualified research expenses.252 
In addition, Section 45C provides a credit specifically for pharmaceutical 
companies engaged in R&D for orphan drugs.253 
While tax incentives do not result in direct funding of R&D, they 
decrease the overall cost of R&D.254 Tax deductions and credits are thus a 
 
 247 HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, PROMOTING 
INNOVATION AND ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 31–32 (2016), 
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report [https://perma.cc/YVT4-THDQ]. 
 248 Medicines Patent Pool offers a similar model to increase access to HIV, Hepatitis C, and 
Tuberculosis medicines in developing countries. See MEDICINES PATENT POOL, 
https://medicinespatentpool.org/ [https://perma.cc/X5NL-FBFW]. 
 249 See Daniel J. Wilson, Beggar Thy Neighbor? The In-State, Out-of-State, and Aggregate Effects 
of R&D Tax Credits, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 431, 431–36 (2009) (discussing state-based incentives and 
their effect on R&D). 
 250 26 U.S.C. §§ 41, 174. 
 251 Id. § 174(a). These expenditures include those incurred in connection with R&D and cover all 
costs that are incidental to the development or improvement of a product, including the cost of obtaining 
a patent, such as attorney fees. 26 C.F.R. § 1.174-2(a) (2014). 
 252 26 U.S.C. § 41(a). Expenses covered under Section 41 include in-house research expenses, as 
well as a percentage of the amounts incurred as a result of third-party services. Id. § 41(b). The “contract 
research expenses” are limited to sixty-five percent of any amount paid by the taxpayer to a third party, 
or seventy-five percent of the amount paid to a qualified research consortium, for qualified research. Id. 
§ 41(b)(3). 
 253 Id. § 45C. The credit is twenty-five percent of the qualified clinical testing expenses, which are 
expenditures related to human clinical testing. 
 254 Hemel & Larrimore Ouellette, supra note 112, at 311. 
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good method to provide additional incentivization for R&D. In 2018, Section 
174 decreased the tax liability of corporations by $2 billion, Section 41 
decreased it by $8.9 billion, and Section 45C by $1.1 billion.255 
Expenses related to AI systems utilized in R&D likely fall within the 
scope of one or more of the existing tax incentives.256 This Article offers an 
additional tax incentive to complement the proposed law reforms in the form 
of lower income tax for royalties and other profits generated from essential 
medicines enabled by AI as discussed in the preceding sections.257 
CONCLUSION 
The patent system is widely criticized for its effect on restricting access 
and hindering subsequent innovation.258 Effects of patents in the 
pharmaceutical industry have particularly been the subject of extensive 
debate.259 Health care is a human right, which cannot be achieved without 
proper access to medicine.260 
AI is revolutionizing pharmaceutical innovation.261 Faster and more 
efficient R&D enabled by AI weakens justifications for pharmaceutical 
patents. AI is a “game changer” in the health care industry,262 and the law 
must keep up to ensure that society reaps the benefits. The principal goal of 
the law reform proposals herein is to leverage AI’s disruption of 
pharmaceutical innovation to ensure that the human right to health is enjoyed 
by all. 
 
 255 See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 
2018-2022 (2018), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?id=5148&func=startdown 
[https://perma.cc/YFX2-448W] (estimating differences between tax liability under present legislation and 
a scenario without the benefits provided therein, assuming that tax payers would behave in the same 
manner under both circumstances). 
 256 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 41, 174. 
 257 See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RES. SERV., R44522, A PATENT/INNOVATION BOX AS A TAX 
INCENTIVE FOR DOMESTIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (2016) (discussing patent box tax incentives, 
a basis for the proposed model, in such countries as the United Kingdom, France, and China, offering 
lower income tax for various revenue generated from intellectual property). 
 258 See WOLFGANG HEIN & SUERIE MOON, INFORMAL NORMS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RULES AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 143 (2013); Gifford, supra note 
101, at 78; Joseph, supra note 138, at 428; Scherer, supra note 15, at 97; Scherer, supra note 51, at 927; 
WIPO Report on the International Patent System, supra note 109, at 78–81. 
 259 See, e.g., HEIN & MOON, supra note 258, at 143; WIPO Report on the International Patent System, 
supra note 109, at 78–81; Scherer, supra note 15, at 97; Scherer, supra note 51, at 927; Joseph, supra 
note 138, at 428; Gifford, supra note 101, at 78. 
 260 See supra notes 128–138 and accompanying text. 
 261 See supra Part I. 
 262 David Arney et al., A User-Focused Transdisciplinary Research Agenda for AI-Enabled Health 
Tech Governance 5–6 (Jan. 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Berkman Klein Center for 
Internet and Society at Harvard University), https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2019-02/2019-
01_aihealth.pdf? [https://perma.cc/3NB4-HAER]. 
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AI inventions raise questions about patentability and patent policy in 
general. Recent developments signal that patent law reform is inevitable.263 
Considering the lack of evidence on the efficiency of the patent system and 
health care’s categorization as a human right, the pharmaceutical industry is 
long overdue for a system that prioritizes access alongside incentivization. 
AI’s disruption of the innovation landscape gives lawmakers the chance to 
finally take action. 
  
 
 263 See supra notes 176–189 and accompanying text. 
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